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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
VS. 
FRANK P. WENTZ, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ; 
| CASE NO. 920100-CA 
I PRIORITY NO. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is conferred 
pursuant to U.C.A. , section 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Appellant assigns the following errors, on the part of 
the trial court, and issues as grounds for his appeal in this 
case: 
A. Did agents from the Utah Department of Public 
Safety have statutory authority to operate in the State of 
Wyoming. 
B. Was the conduct, on the part of the agents from the 
Utah Department of Public Safety, violative of Appellant's 4th 
and 14th Amendment rights under the Constitution of the United 
States. 
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C. Was the conduct, on the part of the agents from the 
Utah Department of Public Safety, violative of Appellant's rights 
under Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. 
D. Was the conduct, on the part of the agents from the 
Utah Department of Public Safety, violative of Appellant's rights 
under Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution. 
E. Was the conduct, on the part of the agents from the 
Utah Department of Public Safety, violative of Appellant's rights 
under Article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a ruling, in the Third Judicial 
Circuit Court, Summit County, Judge Edward A. Watson, denying 
Appellant's Motion to Suppress and Appellant's bench trial 
conviction for 1) Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
violation of U.C.A., section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), and 2) Unlawful 
Importation of Alcohol, a violation of U.C.A., section 32-7-30. 
On or about May 24, 1991 the Appellant went from the State 
of Utah to Evanston, Wyoming with a friend. Appellant was the 
driver of the vehicle. After arriving in Evanston, Wyoming 
Appellant went to Porter's, a liquor store in Evanston, Wyoming, 
and purchased a quantity of beer. After purchasing the beer, the 
Appellant and his companion went to JB's restaurant in Evanston, 
Wyoming and remained there in excess of one hour for the purpose 
of eating. (R, pg. 93, In. 22 - pg. 94, In. 25) 
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On or about May 24, 1991 Agent Brad Blair, an Agent of the 
Utah Department of Public Safety, and several other Agents of the 
Wtafa Department of Public Safety
 f on their own initiative, took 
Utah State vehicles from the State of Utah and proceeded to the 
parking lot of Porter's Liquor store in Evanston, Wyoming. (R, 
pg. 93, In. 2-14; pg. 96, In. 19 - pg. 97, In.17) The agents 
parked in the parking lot of Porter's Liquor store and waited to 
observe vehicles with Utah license plates. 
At some point in time the agents observed the Appellant's 
vehicle pull into the parking lot of Porter's liquor store, 
observed Appellant's Utah license plates, monitored Appellant's 
activities, witnessed the Appellant purchase a quantity of 
alcohol from Porter's, followed Appellant through the streets of 
Evanston, Wyoming, waited outside of JB's Restaurant in Evanston, 
Wyoming while the Appellant ate his meal, followed Appellant on 
his way out of Evanston, Wyoming and after Appellant was 
approximately 1/4 of a mile across the Utah State line stopped 
and searched the Appellant's vehicle. (R, pg. 93, In. 22 - pg. 
95, In. 7) As a result of the stop and subsequent search, a 
quantity of alcohol was seized from the Appellant's vehicle and 
he was issued a citation for unlawful importation of alcohol. 
Pursuant to the stop, the agents observed a "dope pipe" in 
the hand of a passenger of the vehicle, both Appellant and the 
passenger were given their miranda rights, both Appellant and the 
passenger were asked if there was any marijuana on their person 
or in the vehicle, and both individuals directed the agents to 
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marijuana. (R, pg. 104, In. 7, - pg. 106, In. 20). Appellant was 
then arrested and further charged with possession of a controlled 
substance. 
Appellant was charged with 1) Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a violation of U.C.A., section 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i), and 2) Unlawful Importation of Alcohol, a violation 
of U.C.A., section 32-7-30. (R, pg. 12-13) A jury trial was 
originally held in the Summit County Justice Court and Appellant 
was convicted on both charges. Appellant appealed his Justice 
Court jury trial conviction to the Third Circuit Court, Coalville 
Department, and a Trial De Novo was held. Appellant filed a 
motion to suppress in the Circuit Court. In the Circuit Court, a 
hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence was heard 
at the same time that the bench trial was conducted. The Circuit 
Court judge denied the Appellant's Motion to Suppress and found 
the Appellant guilty of both counts of the Information. 
(R, pg. 82, In. 1 - pg. 86, In. 21) 
Appellant now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Did agents from the Utah Department of Public 
Safety have statutory authority to operate in the State of 
Wyoming. 
B. Did the activities of the agents from the Utah 
Department of Public Safety, in the State of Wyoming, constitute 
an illegal search and seizure. 
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C. Was the conduct, on the part of the agents from the 
CTtah Department of Public Safety, violative of Appellant's: 
- 4th and 14th Amendment rights under the 
Constitution of the United States 
- Rights under Article I, section 14 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah 
- Rights under Article I, section 8 of the United 
States Constitution 
- Rights under and Article IV, section 2 of the 
United States Constitution 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
DID THE AGENTS FROM THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY HAVE AUTHORITY TO OPERATE IN THE STATE OF 
WYOMING 
It is clear from the trial record that the agents in this 
case, from the Utah Department of Public Safety, exist as a 
result of the legislature's enactment of U.C.A., section 32A-15-
101. (R, pg. 92, In. 23-24; pg. 96, In. 19 thru pg. 97, In. 19; 
pg. 102, In. 22 thru pg. 103, In. 2; pg. 109, In. 20 thru pg. 
Ill, In. 6) As such, the agents in this case, from the Utah 
Department of Public Safety, "have general law enforcement 
jurisdiction throughout the state." (U.C.A., section 32A-15-
5 
102(2). Thus, under U.C.A., section 32A-15-102(2) the agents in 
this case, from the Utah Department of Public Safety, have 
statutory to operate only within the boundaries of the State of 
Utah. 
This being the case, the question becomes: Is there any 
statutory authority extending these agents jurisdiction beyond 
the borders of the State of Utah? 
Another possible source of these agents' authority could 
stem from U.C.A., section 41-13-7, however, these agents do not 
fit under any of the categories enumerated. 
Another possible source of these agents7 authority could 
stem from U.C.A., section 32A-15-106, however, all references in 
this code section are to powers within the State of Utah. 
Another possible source of these agents7 authority could 
stem from U.C.A., section 77-9-3. However, a close look at 
U.C.A., section 77-9-3, coupled with the facts of this case, 
reveals that the activities of the agents in this case, from the 
Utah Department of Public Safety, do not fall within any of the 
provisions of U.C.A., section 77-9-3. 
In the absence of the state presenting evidence to the 
contrary, it appears clear that: 
1. The agents in this case, from the Utah Department 
of Public Safety, are governed by U.C.A., section 32A-15-101, 
and; 
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2. The agents in this case, from the Utah Department 
of Public Safety, have general law enforcement jurisdiction 
throughout the state pursuant to U.C.A., section 32A-15-102(2). 
3. The agents in this case, from the Utah Department 
of Public Safety, have no authority to operate independently 
outside the boundaries of the State of Utah. 
POINT II 
DID THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AGENTS FROM THE UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY CONSTITUTE 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROHIBITED ACTS 
Appellant relies on the case of State v. Fixel, 744 P2d 1366 
(Utah, 1987). The factual analysis of the officer's activities in 
the Fixel case hold true to the present case, to wit: that the 
law enforcement agents were acting outside the scope of their 
statutory authority when conducting their surveillance in the 
State of Wyoming. 
As o^ ir Supreme Court pointed out, however, in Fixel (Supra, 
at 1368t 1369), such activities in and of themselves do not 
require suppression of the evidence. 
"'Only a 'fundamental7 violation of [a rule of criminal 
procedure] requires automatic suppression, and a violation is 
'fundamental7 only where it, in effect, renders the search 
unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment standards. 
Where the alleged violation ... is not 7fundamental7 suppression 
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is required only where: (1) there was 'prejudice' in the sense 
that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so 
abrasive if the [r]ule had been followed, or (2) there is 
evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision 
of the [r]ule.... It is only where the violation also implicates 
fundamental, constitutional concerns, is conducted in bad-faith 
or has substantially prejudiced the defendant that exclusion may 
be an appropriate remedy. Fixel (Supra, at 1368, 1369) 
It is Appellant's contention herein that, in the instant 
case, the conduct of the agents from the Utah Department of 
Public Safety was so outrageous that due process principles would 
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial process to 
obtain a conviction. [SEE United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 
431-32, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1643, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973)] 
The basis for this contention is as follows: 
1. Governmental Entrapment occurred: government 
conduct entrapment occurs where governmental participation is so 
outrageous or fundamentally unfair as to deprive the defendant of 
due process or as to move the courts to exercise their 
supervisory jurisdiction over the administration of criminal 
justice. [SEE United States v. Killough, 607 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 
(D.Ark. 1985)] It is fundamentally wrong for law enforcement 
agents from the State of Utah to randomly spy on residents from 
the State of Utah outside the boundaries of the State of Utah 
where the individuals are not the subject of a specific criminal 
investigation stemming from activities within the State of Utah. 
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2. The activities of the agents, in this case, 
from the Utah Department of Public Safety, constituted an 
unreasonable search under Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution and the 4th and 14th Amendments of the Constitution 
of the United States: It is fundamentally violative, of Article 
I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the 4th and 14th 
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, to condone 
law enforcement agents from the State of Utah to randomly spy on 
residents from the State of Utah outside the boundaries of the 
State of Utah where the individuals, who are the subjects of such 
police activities, are not the focus of a specific criminal 
investigation stemming from activities within the State of Utah. 
Utah residents have an expectation of privacy in their travel to 
other states and in their lawful activities in other states 
without "big brother" watching. Such ad hoc monitoring of 
residents of Utah outside the boundaries of Utah by Utah law 
enforcement officials without legal authority constitutes an 
illegal search in violation of the foregoing constitutional 
provisions. 
Further, Appellant contends that the activities engaged in 
by the agents, from the Utah Department of Public Safety, 
violated Appellant's due process rights afforded by the 14th 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. "Due process 
of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for 
those personal immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice 
wrote for the Court, are so rooted in the traditions and 
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conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Rochin 
v. People of California, 72 S.Ct. 205, 208(1952) The conduct 
engaged in by the agents from the Utah Department of Public 
Safety, is conduct which "...more than offends some fastidious 
squeamishness or private sentimentality about combatting crime 
too energetically. It is conduct that shocks the conscience." 
Rochin (Supra, pg. 209) 
3. The activities of the agents, in this case, 
from the Utah Department of Public Safety, constituted a 
violation of Article I, section 8 of the United States 
Constitution: The presence of Utah law enforcement officials, in 
the State of Wyoming, without authority, constituted an attempt 
on the part of Utah to regulate commerce among the several 
states. This is an area which is specifically reserved, by 
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution, for the 
appropriate governmental branches of the Unites States government 
and is neither a legitimate state function nor a justifiable 
state purpose. 
4. The activities of the agents, in this case, 
from the Utah Department of Public Safety, constituted a 
violation of Article IV, section 2 of the United States 
Constitution: The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. 
Appellant alleges that these privileges and immunities include 
the right to travel between Utah and other states and conduct 
lawful activities outside the boundaries of Utah without 
10 
government interference and without the government engaging in 
conduct which places a "chilling effect" upon such legal 
activities. 
Appellant contends that, based upon these four grounds, 
either a "fundamental violation," has occurred, to wit: activity 
which renders the search unconstitutional under traditional 
fourth amendment standards, and thus exclusion/suppression of the 
evidence is required or, in the alternative, a "non-fundamental" 
violation has occurred, to wit: the activities implicate 
fundamental, constitutional concerns, are conducted in bad-faith 
or the activities have substantially prejudiced the defendant, 
and therefore exclusion/suppression of the evidence is an 
appropriate remedy. State v. Larocco, 794 P2d 460, 471 (Utah, 
1990) 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing grounds, and based upon the foregoing 
arguments, it appears that the agents from the Utah Department of 
Public Safety engaged in unauthorized conduct beyond the borders 
of the State of Utah. Their conduct was offensive, 
constitutionally violative, and shocking to the senses. The 
conduct should be punished by invoking the exclusionary rule, 
further, due to the taint of their unlawful and constitutionally 
violative conduct, the defendant's arrest should be held 
unconstitutional. 
As such, Appellant requests that this Court: 
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1. Reverse the Appellant's convictions; 
2. Grant such other and further relief as this court deems 
appropriate. 
Dated this 19th day of June, 1992. 
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32A-15-101. Creation of Bureau of Narcotics 
and Alcoholic Beverage Law Enforce* 
ment 
There is created within the Department of Public 
Safety the Bureau of Narcotics and Alcoholic Bever-
age Law Enforcement. mo 
32A-15-102. Responsibility and jurisdiction. 
The bureau shall: 
(1) have specific responsibility for the enforce-
ment of all laws of the state pertaining to alco-
holic beverages and products; 
(2) have general law enforcement jurisdiction 
throughout the state; 
(3) have concurrent law enforcement jurisdic-
tion with all local law enforcement agencies and 
their officers. The bureau does not relieve local 
law enforcement agencies or officers of the re-
sponsibility of enforcing laws relating to alco-
holic beverages and products or any other laws; 
(4) sponsor or supervise programs or projects 
related to prevention, detection, and control of 
violations of Title 32A, the Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Act, and the Utah Controlled Substance 
Act; and 
(5) respond to the call of the governor for 
emergency or other purposes as the governor 
may require. mo 
13A 
32A-15-102. Responsibility and jurisdiction. 
The bureati shall: 
(1) have specific responsibility for the enforce-
ment of all laws of the state pertaining to alco-
holic beverages and products; 
(2) have general law enforcement jurisdiction 
throughout the state; 
(3) have concurrent law enforcement jurisdic-
tion with all local law enforcement agencies and 
their officers. The bureau does not relieve local 
law enforcement agencies or officers of the re-
sponsibility of enforcing laws relating to alco-
holic beverages and products or any other laws; 
(4) sponsor br supervise programs or projects 
related to prevention, detection, and control of 
violations of Title 32A, the Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Act, and the Utah Controlled Substance 
Act; and 
(5) respond to the call of the governor for 
emergency or other purposes as the governor 
may require. 1990 
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32A-15406. Director and officers to have peace 
officer powers. 
(1) The director of the bureau and each enforce-
ment officer 
(a) is vested with the powers of peace officers 
throughout the several counties of the state, with 
the exception of the power to serve civil process; 
(b) has the powers and duties of inspectors un-
der Title 32A, the Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Act; 
(c) may serve criminal process and arrest and 
prosecute violators of any law of this state; and 
(d) have the same rights as other peace officers 
to require aid in executing their duties. 
(2) The powers and duties conferred upon the direc-
tor and the officers of the bureau are not a limitation 
upon the powers and duties of other peace officers in 
the state. iwo 
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41-13-7. Allocation of duties. 
In general, the allocation of duties of the Depart-
ment of Public Safety shall be as follows: 
(1) Commissioner's office. 
(2) Division of Utah Highway Patrol. 
(3) Division of Drivers' License and Accident 
Records. 
(4) Division of Safety Education and Promo-
tion. 
(5) Division of Safety and Financial Responsi-
bility. 
(6) Division of the State Fire Marshal. 1985 
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77-9-3. Authority of peace officer of this state 
beyond normal jurisdiction. 
(1) Any peace officer duly authorized by any gov-
ernmental entity of this state may exercise a peace 
officer's authority beyond the limits of such officer's 
normal jurisdiction as follows: 
(a) When in fresh pursuit of stn offender for the 
purpose of arresting and holding that person in 
custody or returning the suspect to the jurisdic-
tion where the offense was committed; 
(b) When a public offense is committed in such 
officer's presence; 
(c) When participating in an investigation of 
criminal activity which originated in such offi-
cer's normal jurisdiction in cooperation with the 
local authority; 
(d) When called to assist peace officers of an-
other jurisdiction. 
(2) Any peace officer, prior to taking such autho-
rized action, shall notify and receive approval of the 
local law enforcement authority, or if such prior con-
tact is not reasonably possible, notify the local law 
enforcement authority as soon as reasonably possible. 
Unless specifically requested to aid a police officer of 
another jurisdiction or otherwise as provided for by 
law, no legal responsibility for a police officer's action 
outside his normal jurisdiction and as provided here-
in, shall attach to the local law enforcement author-
ity. 1980 
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